Fed's bold actions harken back to Volcker era by Jim Bullard
important difference is that U.S. inflation 
and long-term interest rates are currently 
very low.  In fact, market-based indicators 
of inflation expectations may be drifting 
toward deflation.  Still, there is a clear atmo-
sphere of crisis.  Financial turmoil continues 
to impact a wide range of financial markets 
and institutions around the globe.  The Fed 
has lost its usual ability to signal to the pri-
vate sector via nominal interest rates as the 
policy rate has reached the zero bound.
As in October 1979, the Fed has reacted to 
the crisis situation with an aggressive change 
in policy.  Like the Federal Reserve in Vol-
cker’s time, today’s Fed has taken unprece-
dented actions, departing from its traditional 
approach to monetary policy—interest-rate 
targeting—and focusing on quantitative 
measures instead.  Beginning in December 
of last year, the FOMC shifted its focus for 
future policy to the Fed’s balance sheet.
In some ways, our current environment 
parallels the Japanese experience after 1990.  
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lsewhere in this issue, you will find an 
article titled “This is not your father’s 
recession ... or is it?”  It compares today’s 
recession with those of the past 40 years.  
In the same spirit, I would like to compare 
today’s Fed, and the challenges we face, with 
the Volcker Fed of 1979.
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During the 1970s, monetary policy had 
followed a gradualist approach: fine-tuning 
interest rate moves in an effort to avert 
economic slowdowns.  By 1979, it had 
become apparent that such a strategy was 
inadequate as inflation and inflation expec-
tations continued to march upward and the 
real economy deteriorated.  Inflation rose 
steadily from about 2 percent through  
much of the ’60s to more than 13 percent  
in December 1979.  The Federal Reserve  
was not seen by the public as credibly fight-
ing inflation.
A drastic change in the approach to mon-
etary policy was needed by the Fed in order 
to regain its credibility, tame inflation and 
restore confidence in financial markets.  The 
plan had to allow for substantial increases in 
short-term interest rates while, at the same 
time, reassuring financial markets that this 
new policy approach would be effective and 
the cost of disinflation would be minimized.
On Oct. 6, 1979, the Fed, under Paul 
Volcker’s leadership, shifted its focus from 
targeting nominal interest rates to targeting 
non-borrowed reserves to control the money 
supply.  Volcker’s “monetarist experiment” 
was ultimately successful in stabilizing 
inflation and anchoring inflation expecta-
tions.  The economy experienced a sharp 
recession, but was then set for a long period 
of stable growth.  For more than two-and-
a-half decades following the monetarist 
experiment, the economy grew in long 
stretches, punctuated by just two relatively 
mild recessions.
The situation we face today is not that 
faced by the Volcker Fed in 1979.  One 
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The Japanese banking system encountered 
difficulties with “troubled assets,” and the 
intermediation system broke down.  Eventu-
ally, persistent year-over-year deflation was 
observed in core measures of inflation, and 
average economic growth stagnated.  In 
Japan, policy rates have been below 1 percent 
for 14 years, and deflation was observed for 
more than a decade.  An outcome of sus-
tained deflation and extremely low nominal 
interest rates, as happened in Japan, is some-
times referred to as a deflationary trap.
To avoid the Japanese experience, the 
Fed will need to provide enough sustained 
growth in the monetary base to offset down-
ward pressure on inflation coming from the 
very sharp recession.  At the same time, the 
Fed cannot provide such a sustained high 
level of monetary growth that medium-run 
inflation takes hold.  Either way, the signals 
that the Fed sends about its future intentions 
have to come from quantitative measures of 
policy and not from interest rate movements.
This is a very different mode of operation 
than what the Fed and the financial markets 
have been used to over the past two decades.  
By acting aggressively, the Fed may be able 
to replicate the success of Volcker’s Fed 30 
years ago. 
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